This paper makes explicit the role of the entrepreneur in a consumer-producer economy. Entrepreneurial behavior changes the status quo by altering existing comparative advantages. A positive feedback effect with trading institutions ensues. This model shows how the entrepreneur can, when successful, create economic growth but if unsuccessful, can contribute to an economic contraction. Using our theoretical approach, propositions are generated that explain empirical observations of entrepreneurship. This framework offers a tool for future analytical and empirical investigations into entrepreneurship in a systematic way.
change and ultimately growth potential in an economy's structure. Hayek [1945] saw the role of the entrepreneur as using idiosyncratic knowledge and Kirzner [1973] further argued that it is the "alertness" of the entrepreneur in acting on a profit opportunity that affects growth. If, as Lazear [2005] states, "the entrepreneur is the single most important player in a modern economy," a rigorous analytical framework based on modern microeconomic theory would be a useful aid in understanding the economic role of the entrepreneur.
There is some controversy as to whether a mathematical framework is an appropriate tool for the study of entrepreneurship (see Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) . This paper shows that the economic behavior of the entrepreneur lends itself to an analytical investigation. The decision problem of the entrepreneur involves changing the status quo. When the entrepreneur chooses to do this, and what effect it has on the economy are questions not answered by standard neoclassical microeconomic theory. Yet the neoclassical analysis has proved to be a powerful tool that has given economists precise arguments for such things as competitive markets, welfare comparisons and policy analysis. Therefore, rather than separate entrepreneurs from this microeconomic model, we should introduce the entrepreneur into the model, creating a more unified micro framework. As Holcombe [1998] summarizes, "the incorporation of entrepreneurship into the framework of economic growth not only fills in the institutional details to help make the growth process more understandable, but also points toward more promising economic policy recommendations for fostering economic growth" (p. 60). By using this type of analysis, this paper seeks to contribute a first step towards a unified 'ground-up' theory of entrepreneurship, consumers, producers and the development of the institutions (firms, legal systems, etc.) in which they operate. This is done by demonstrating a positive feedback between entrepreneurship, institutions and market structures. Witt and Zellner [2006] assert that there is "an incessant sequence of institutional adaptations to changing production technologies which, in turn, influence the incentives in society to drive the development of technology further" (p. 1).
The model introduced in this paper builds on the mathematical formulation of inframarginal models pioneered by such researchers as Yang and Yao [2001] , Ng and Yang [1997] , Wen [1998] , Sun [2002] and others. Inframarginal, also known as new classical, analysis is defined in Yang [2003] as "a total benefit-cost analysis across corner and interior solutions, in addition to marginal analysis of each corner and interior solution" (p. 9). New classical theorists assume individuals are initially both consumers and producers. This literature asserts that each individual will not just optimize within given institutions or market structures, but will evaluate different institutions and seek to specialize and trade if higher utility is achievable. Much of this literature has been concerned with an ambitious research agenda: proving the existence of equilibria of the most general models, proving analogues to the classical first and second welfare theorems and pursuing many applications. Analysis for this type of model focuses mainly on trade-offs between transaction efficiency and economies of specialization, 2 in which endogenous changes are driven by exogenous improvements in transaction efficiency. However, Yang [2003] does allude to a role for the entrepreneur to act as a middleman that improves transaction efficiency. This paper takes a different approach with inframarginal analysis. Rather than assume economies of specialization through increasing returns to labor, we show how an entrepreneur's decision creates economies of specialization indirectly by attempting to implement a potential venture idea. This attempt alters the status quo and hence creates a comparative advantage. When an altered configuration of comparative advantages is anticipated, individuals evaluate possible trading institutions and find economies of specialization by exploiting classical Ricardian gains from trade.
There are two main reasons the consumer-producer paradigm (i.e, new classical analysis) is conducive for the study of entrepreneurship. First, there is evidence that the entrepreneur sees an opportunity because he himself is a user or consumer. That is, the constraint he wants to change binds him personally. For example, von Hippel [2001] alludes to the entrepreneur being both a consumer and producer by calling this person a User (defined there as someone who appropriates technology for his own personal productivity and possibly sells it to a manufacturer.) 3 Second, given the individuals' relevant constraints, the entrepreneur may choose the corner solution, namely, not to use entrepreneurial effort. Shane and Venkataraman [2000] point out, "Not only must there be a discovery of opportunity but [entrepreneurs] must choose to act on it. We can only empirically look at when people choose to act. But it is when they choose not to that is also important both theoretically and for policy." Therefore analytical models must be able to handle inframarginal decisions.
We can use this analysis to trace how market institutions might evolve through rational, mutually beneficial decisions when the entrepreneur attempts to create a comparative advantage. One insight from this model is that trade has a more subtle benefit than the usual gains from trade. In this way, comparative advantage and trade, long seen as an engine of growth, can be traced to entrepreneurial decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the entrepreneurial economy model. Section 3 proceeds to investigate conditions for entrepreneurial action when the entrepreneur acts alone (that is, with no market available for specialization and trade) as the benchmark case. Section 4 studies entrepreneurship in the context of a competitive market when a venture idea is production specific. Section 5 concludes.
The entrepreneurship literature makes a distinction between product and process entrepreneurs. The model below analyzes a production process entrepreneur, which is an individual who has an idea about improving the technology that produces a specific consumption good. The framework, though, can also be interpreted and analyzed from the perspective of a product quality improvement. The venture idea (defined below) would yield higher utility of the consumption good rather than a technological improvement that yields more of the consumption good.
Many of the formal definitions found in the paper are due to ideas conceptualized in Eckhardt and Shane [2003] and Davidsson [2002] who built on the theoretical foundation laid by Casson [1982] , Venkataraman [1997] and Shane and Venkataraman [2000] . For instance, these authors refined the definition of entrepreneurial opportunity. However, due to recurring confusion and debate in the literature over the precise meaning of "opportunity", Davidsson [2003] argues persuasively for the term "venture ideas."
An Entrepreneurial Economy
Let M be a finite set in R ++ in which a typical element m specifies the production coefficient (technology). Denote the current, status quo, production process for a consumption good as m 0 . Define the set of technologies K = {k ∈ M|k ≤ m 0 } as the set of known technologies and the set U = {m 1 ∈ M|m 1 > m 0 } as the set of (currently) untried or unimplemented technologies. Hence the space of all relationships or ideas, M, is partitioned into two sets where the status quo technology is the highest element, m 0 , in K. A Venture Idea is an element of the set U.
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There are two consumption goods x ∈ R + and y ∈ R + . Let l x and l y denote labor time allocated to the production of x and y respectively and l e denote an entrepreneurial investment of time implementing one's venture idea.
A Potential Entrepreneur is an individual who has a venture idea, m 1 ∈ U. A potential entrepreneur becomes an Entrepreneur by choosing positive entrepreneurial effort l e > 0.
There are two individuals i ∈ {E, P }. E denotes a potential entrepreneur (m E 1 ∈ U) and P denotes a [potential] trading partner who is not a potential entrepreneur.
5 Both individuals are endowed with one unit of labor (L i = 1). 6 Therefore the time constraints for each individual i ∈ I are:
Each individual has a utility function 7 :
Production exhibits constant returns to scale in the one input (labor). As mentioned, most of the inframarginal literature assumes increasing returns. Extensions of this work will also consider increasing returns. However, the assumption of constant returns to scale is used in order to handicap the entrepreneur. This way, we can discover whether there are fundamental motivations for entrepreneurial effort rather than exploiting increasing returns. The marginal product of labor for good y is 1 for simplicity. Good x can be produced with the status quo technology in which the marginal product of labor is m 0 or some labor effort can be used to try and change this technology. Thus the current production functions can be written as:
A potential entrepreneur faces a two-stage decision. In the first stage, he decides whether or not to use entrepreneurial effort by weighing the two possible second stage states that might arise if he becomes an entrepreneur. These two possible states are success or failure. An entrepreneur's probability of success is a function of his entrepreneurial investment time l e . Let the functionγ : [0, 1] → (0, 1], translate entrepreneurial investment, l e into a (subjective) probability of success. Thus if an individual chooses to implement his venture idea (l i e > 0) either with probabilityγ i (l e ), m i 1 will be realized and can be used, or with probability 1 −γ i (l e ), m 0 (i.e., the status quo technology) will be used. The ex-post state that obtains is random 8 , but the entrepreneur can improve his probability of success with greater entrepreneurial effort, because we assumeγ (l e ) > 0.
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For this paper we assume a linear functional form for the probability of success function 10 :
The entrepreneurial investment process gives the entrepreneur an expectation of success. This expectation is an individual (subjective) perception, although it may be a shared perception (as we assume in the trade case below). This formulation captures the intuition that one's entrepreneurial effort positively affects one's perception of their probability of success but there are other (random) factors that may play a role such that success is not guaranteed. Entrepreneurial efficiency can be described by the parameter γ. This can be interpreted in a number of ways for specific case analysis and/or calibrated for specific empirical studies. For example, this parameter could capture how conducive an economic environment is for entrepreneurial activity. Is it very difficult to be a successful entrepreneur due to bureaucratic restrictions? Is the economy populated by a number of potential entrepreneurs that may help increase probability of success or are there relatively few individuals with venture ideas that lead to a perception of greater inertia? This parameter could also be used to capture more individual characteristics. For example, has this entrepreneur been successful in the past? If the discovery process is a success, the entrepreneur can produce:
otherwise he must produce, x E according to the current (or status quo) technology (equation 5) above.
Case 1: No Trade
In this section, we drop the entrepreneur's superscript since there is no possibility of confusion. As mentioned above, the economic environment creates a two-stage problem for the entrepreneur. In the first stage, given his (perceived) entrepreneurial efficiency (γ) and venture idea (m 1 ), he evaluates what level of entrepreneurial effort would maximize his expected utility by forecasting his possible second stage outcomes. That is, in the second stage, if he chooses to act on his idea, he will either succeed or fail. Let U Success and U F ail denote his respective maximum utility in each of these ex-post states. If he determines that he will not use entrepreneurial effort, then his utility remains what it has been. We will denote this status quo utility as U SQ 11 . Thus in choosing whether to act or not, he compares his expected utility from his idea with the maximum utility he is receiving with the status quo technology. To better visualize the entrepreneur's problem a decision tree may be helpful.
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11 Note that is also the [potential] trading partner's utility in autarky since the two individuals are ex-ante identical.
12 To be technically the precise, the entrepreneur faces an infinite number of choices of l e > 0 in the continuum (0,1]. The entrepreneur chooses the l e > 0 that gives him the most expected utility. For concision and simplicity we show this as l * e .
The following propositions follow from the framework. Many of the proofs are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
13 Some proofs are included to demonstrate the technique.
Proposition 1 Given the above model, a potential entrepreneur in autarky, who allocates no time to entrepreneurial effort, has maximal status quo utility of
The proof is an immediate consequence of maximizing (3) subject to equations (1) and (4-6).
Proposition 2 Given the above model, an entrepreneur in autarky, if successful, has a maximum utility of U Success = m 1 (
, which is a function of the chosen level of entrepreneurial effort.
Proposition 3 Given the above model, an entrepreneur in autarky, if unsuccessful, has maximal utility of
Given the above model and propositions 1, 2 and 3, an entrepreneur in autarky chooses his optimal entrepreneurial effort, l * e , in order to solve the problem max le {U SQ , (γU Success + (1 −γ)U F ail )} subject to 0 ≤ l e ≤ 1 andγ = γl e . The next proposition makes clear exactly when a potential entrepreneur will choose each of these solutions. Let E A ⊂ (0, 1] × U be the set of pairs (γ, m 1 ) such that the potential entrepreneur chooses l e > 0.
Proposition 4 Given the above autarky model, E
}.
Proof
The proof proceeds by solving the entrepreneur's decision problem. From proposition 1 we know the value of the first element in the entrepreneur's decision set,
. Turning to the second element, we must first solve the entrepreneur's optimization problem.
From Proposition 2 and 3 we know
Setting the first derivative equal to zero and solving yields either
13 The proofs can also be found on the author's website at astro.temple.edu\~karen3.
The first solution is the minimum; spending all one's time on entrepreneurial effort leaves no time to produce the goods that bring utility. The second solution achieves the maximum. By substituting this positive maximal entrepreneurial effort, l * e into the entrepreneur's expected utility equation above, we have:
Utility maximization requires entrepreneurial effort to be positive when this expected utility, equation 10, overcomes the entrepreneur's certain status quo utility. Therefore the entrepreneur's effort will jump from l e = 0 to l e = 
The model predicts that the potential entrepreneur jumps from a corner solution (decision not to be entrepreneurial) to a positive solution when he believes doing so will yield higher utility than he is currently receiving. This jump in effort is intuitive. Entrepreneurs often express it in words such as "I took the plunge" or "I saw the opportunity and decided to go for it." When potential entrepreneurs choose the corner solution, l e = 0, they expect the opportunity to yield them less than or equal to what they are currently receiving in utility. This is expressed by many potential entrepreneurs with phrases such as, "I once had an idea for ... but never acted on it." For each entrepreneur, the effort level will be different given the size of his venture idea (or opportunity) and his evaluation of how successful he will be if he puts forth positive effort.
The optimal level of effort is negative at low potential ideas and is exactly equal to zero when the potential idea yields the same expected utility as the status quo. Potential ideas greater than this zero level, will be those for which entrepreneurship is empirically observed.
For policy purposes, it is interesting to look at some comparative statics on entrepreneurial effort in terms of what influence has the greatest effect on entrepreneurial behavior.
Corollary 1 Assuming the above model and proposition 4, if l e > 0, then assuming all else equal, entrepreneurial effort will (1) decrease if the status quo technology increases (2) increase if the size of the venture idea increases and (3) increase if entrepreneurial efficiency, γ increases.
The proof is found by taking the appropriate partial derivatives of the optimal interior entrepreneurial effort.
This corollary has interesting implications for empirical work as well. In cases where the model's assumptions hold, this corollary may help explain why we see technology plateaus. That is, initially there is high entrepreneurial effort in an industry. As this higher level becomes the new status quo, less entrepreneurial effort may result perhaps because individuals might become more complacent in discovering new technologies, or perhaps because the additional benefits from getting more of the same good are falling.
Note that these results obtain even though:
1. There are no explicit increasing returns to new technology.
2. The entrepreneur is not relatively more risk-loving than the general population.
3. The entrepreneur gets no direct, intrinsic utility from entrepreneurial effort or his venture idea.
Case 2: With Trade
Next we would like to determine how a market institution might affect the entrepreneur's behavior. By modifying the above model to account for trade and comparing the results to the autarky case, we can ask such questions as: What effect does trade have on entrepreneurial effort and productivity improvement? Why do we see some evidence that there may be more business failures in a more developed market economy versus in less developed market economies? Why do we see evidence that large firms often make smaller incremental improvements while small firms make larger incremental improvements? 14 Why might we observe relative price changes for a good without any observable change in production technology?
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To account for trade, we modify the above model by defining a market price for the two goods and adding a budget constraint to each individual's behavior decision. First define prices for x and y as p x and p y respectively. Then define the relative price as p = p x /p y . As before x i and y i denote the amount of each good produced by individual i. Let x is and x id denote the amount of good x supplied and demanded respectively by individual i and define y is , y id analogously. Then an individual's budget constraint is
Each individual is still assumed to have the same preferences for the two consumption goods x and y. However the utility function can be written to show the consumption of each good coming from trade. Precisely:
Each individual's time endowment is still normalized to 1 unit of time that can be spent producing x, y or on entrepreneurial effort. The current (status quo) production 14 In the literature this is usually distinguished by the terms innovations versus inventions. The former are the smaller incremental improvements made on inventions.
15 For example, industries that experience price increases may also report higher profits. This would seem to contradict the neoclassical theory that price is a reflection of marginal cost. Indeed, higher prices combined with higher profits often triggers regulators to investigate claims of price-gouging or collusion. Although this paper does not attempt to answer specific cases, it gives regulators another analysis tool that could potentially be applied to these cases.
functions are also the same for both individuals:
. Therefore the entrepreneur is successful with probabilityγ and thus has a comparative advantage in producing x. That is:
where, recall, m E 1 > m 0 . For this section we also assume the following.
Assumption 1 Property rights to a new venture idea are respected by the trading partner. That is, if an entrepreneur successfully implements a new technology, the trading partner will not steal this technology to use in her own production.
This condition is arguably strong (unless the entrepreneur can effectively keep the technology a secret). We use it here to analyze one type of equilibrium. This condition may seem implausible given that we are talking about entrepreneurship and a new technology (and given that there are only two traders). Indeed almost all the literature studying entrepreneurship makes the assumption that the market is either monopolistic or oligopolistic. Therefore either explicitly or implicitly much of the motivation for entrepreneurial effort comes from a priori monopoly profit. By assuming competitive markets and letting the entrepreneur try to create economic gains, we reveal more subtle entrepreneurial motivations. In a sense, the model here stacks the deck against the entrepreneur. Assuming a competitive market and identical individuals at the status quo, there is no gain to be had at the status quo equilibrium (Proposition 5 below). Hence if the entrepreneur wants to gain, he must find a way to change the status quo. It is in this way we can trace economic growth through the entrepreneur's actions.
Assumption 3 Individuals agree to specialize and trade prior to knowing whether the entrepreneur will be successful or not. Once they agree, this contract is fully enforceable.
In the consumer-producer framework Diamantaras and Gilles [2004] (building on the work of Wen, 1998) prove a theorem that individuals do at least as well if not better by completely specializing in production (in other words they don't buy and sell the same good). They prove this assuming only two weak regularity conditions on the transaction efficiency and the utility function, which are satisfied in the set-up of this model. Theorem 1 (Diamantaras and Gilles) If in any configuration the individual buys and sells the same good, then there is a configuration in which the individual does not buy and sell the same good and in which the individual is at least as well off.
For this reason we assume here, when individuals trade, both completely specialize in the production of the good for which they have an expected comparative advantage. Here the entrepreneur will expect to change his production technology for good x. Therefore, if there is trade, the entrepreneur will produce and sell x while the trading partner will produce and sell y.
A decision tree may again be helpful in visualizing the entrepreneur's decision when trade is possible.
As in the previous section we proceed with proposing the pay-offs to the entrepreneur at each of the possible terminal nodes. The proofs are immediate substitutions of the chosen functional forms. Proposition 7 Given the two person trade model and assumptions 1, 2, and 3 an entrepreneur who trades and is unsuccessful has a utility of U
which is a function of the chosen level of entrepreneurial effort, good x supplied and the relative price of x.
The resulting entrepreneurial behavior can be compared to the entrepreneur's behavior in the no trade case.
Proposition 8 Given the two person trade model and assumptions 1, 2, and 3 an entrepreneur in autarky with no trading opportunity has a lower positive amount of entrepreneurial effort than when there is a trading opportunity.
Proof The proof involves solving the entrepreneur's decision problem when trade is possible and comparing it to optimal entrepreneurial effort given in Proposition 4 (l ). The entrepreneur's ex-ante expected utility is a weighted average of his utility from success and failure. Since his probability of success isγ = γl e , the problem becomes:
From Propositions 6 and 7 above we have:
Setting the derivatives,
and ∂EU M ∂x s equal to zero, gives two equations with two unknowns.
The solutions of these equations are:
Substituting appropriately and simplifying yields:
Again recalling from the proof of proposition 4 the interior optimal level of entrepreneurial effort in autarky, it is true that
Baumol [2005] and others make a case for market based reforms as a way of fostering entrepreneurship with empirical studies showing significant positive correlation between the two. Proposition 8 demonstrates a possible theory behind this statistical link: when there is a market for goods, greater entrepreneurial effort (investment) can occur. The following corollary and proof give further insight into this link between markets and entrepreneurship. The first lends theoretical support for observing more incremental Figure 3 Threshold values of venture ideas for various entrepreneurial efficiencies technological improvements in market economies; the second gives theoretical credence to the critique that greater openness to trade may result in higher volatility in output.
When there is a market opportunity, define E M ⊂ (0, 1]×U as the set of pairs (γ, m 1 ) such that the individual chooses to become an entrepreneur, l e > 0.
Proposition 9 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
This proof is in the appendix but demonstrated here by the following four graphs in figure 3 where γ = .25, .5, .75, 1.0 respectively. Proposition 9 may help explain empirical evidence suggesting that large firms make smaller relative improvements while small firms implement greater relative improvements.
17 There is a trade-off between the size of the improvement and entrepreneurial efficiency. The more incremental the improvement (venture ideas closer to the status quo), the higher the γ needs to be to induce entrepreneurial effort. Arguably, large firms may have greater entrepreneurial efficiencies 18 due to such things as greater access to financial and other capital resources and greater specialization within firms giving individuals more time to invest.
19 If this is true, then large firms would, in general, have higher γ s than small firms. Thus using this model, we would predict that more incremental improvements would come from large firms while small firms would have bigger relative improvements over the status quo. Because small firms attempt venture ideas further from the status quo, they may also give a perception of being more entrepreneurial than large firms.
Further Implications of the Framework
This paper has developed an analytical tool for studying the entrepreneur. The propositions thus far have shown the framework is useful for explaining some of our intuitive 17 C.f. Ace and Audretsch [2005] , CHI Research Inc.
[2003] and Detienne [2001] 18 Entrepreneurs in large firms are usually referred to as intrapreneurs. 19 Some researchers have pointed out that small business entrepreneurs often need to be "jack of all trades." This may be more a consequence of the institutional form in which the entrepreneur is operating rather than a feature of entrepreneurship.
and empirical understanding of entrepreneurs. The following propositions use the tool to gain insight into a phenomenon that is perhaps not as well understood or explained; namely, how does the positive feedback channel between entrepreneurship and market institutions work?
The first proposition explains the incentives entrepreneurs have for seeking market opportunities. Traditional Ricardian gains from trade analysis begins with an exogenous comparative advantage. Here an exogenous comparative advantage is one for which the individual-entrepreneur can produce x with technology m 1 without exerting any entrepreneurial effort, while the trading partner produces x with technology m 0 . We find that, given the assumption of a competitive market, although the entire economy experiences traditional Ricardian gains from trade, the individual-entrepreneur with an exogenous comparative advantage 20 does not strictly benefit from trade. Interestingly, though, the entrepreneur who creates a comparative advantage through entrepreneurial effort does expect to strictly benefit from trade.
Proposition 10 Given the two person trade model and assumptions 1, 2 and 3, an individual with an exogenous comparative advantage is indifferent between autarky and a market. In contrast, an entrepreneur who creates a comparative advantage expects greater utility in a market than in autarky.
The proof is omitted but one can verify that when comparative advantages are exogenous and the market price is the competitive price, the individual with a comparative advantage in x production gets the same utility whether he trades or operates in autarky. The lower technology trading partner does strictly better in the presence of an exogenous comparative advantage. In contrast, the table below demonstrates the additional gains an entrepreneur expects from having a trade opportunity when his expected comparative advantage in x is endogenous. In the table the status quo technology, m 0 , is normalized to 1 and entrepreneurial efficiency in the economy is γ = 0.6. The following table calculates some expected utilities for different venture ideas.
From Table 1 we see that the entrepreneur in the endogenous case would choose l e > 0 in the range of approximately 2.7 ≤ m 1 ≤ 4.3 when a trade is possible, but does not do so in autarky. In this range, not only does a market produce above 'normal' expected gains from trade, but having a market makes the difference for entrepreneurship to occur. Thus the model gives theoretical insight into a phenomenon that would be difficult if not impossible to observe empirically. It reveals ranges for which potential entrepreneurs choose not to act due to undeveloped market opportunities. This underdevelopment hinders one's ability to specialize and therefore limits ones time to invest. The time constraint combined with the inherent uncertainty constraint leads to less individuals choosing to be entrepreneurial.
Proposition 10 is interesting for a number of reasons. The most notable is the presence of expected gains from having a market, even when the expected price is equal to the expected marginal cost. This offers a theoretical link between societies populated with potential entrepreneurs and the development of market institutions. That is, we would expect individuals, given the opportunity to create comparative advantages, would seek to create markets in which to trade. It is not the competitiveness, per se, of a market that is the driving factor but rather the openness or availability of a market that is important.
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Besides the investment time advantage, the presence of the market benefits the entrepreneur in another way. By specializing, the entrepreneur does not produce y and therefore the production of good y is not disrupted by his failure. Had he not been able to trade, he would have reduced some of his time producing y in order to pursue his venture idea. In the event of failure, in autarky, he would not only lose some of x but he also loses some y. In a market, on the other hand, y production is not diminished. Given our competitive market assumption and the enforceability of contracts, the entrepreneur is able to consume the same amount of y as he would at the status quo (and both consume either more or less x depending on whether the entrepreneur succeeds or fails). Given that the trading partner now also faces decreased consumption if the entrepreneur fails, one might suspect that trade agreements or market institutions may be trickier to implement than the assumptions of this paper.
22 By relaxing assumption 3 one could study, for example, how institutions of risk-sharing might arise.
By incorporating entrepreneurs into the economy, a more dynamic micro economy emerges where the maximized amount of consumption goods can increase or decrease. That is, if the entrepreneur chooses to act rationally on his idea, then he ex-ante efficiently allocates his time resource. If he subsequently realizes a failure, the maximized amount produced given his failure is an efficient amount. In other words, it is not the success or failure of the entrepreneur that determines whether entrepreneurial effort is efficient. Although failure constitutes an economic loss, consumption below that of the previous status quo level, the entrepreneur would not have attempted to implement his idea if he did not rationally expect a gain. The risk of failure helps to temper entrepreneurial effort such that there is not too much economic upheaval. (Without some risk of failure new ideas would be implemented as soon as they were thought. Although change is good, too much change may negate some of the productivity benefits of learning by doing, etc. as well as being very disruptive, in general, for society.)
Lastly the framework can be used to study the way market prices transmit information regarding entrepreneurial activity. Competitive market prices transmit signals regarding the relative states of demand and supply; the final utility of each individual is indirectly dependent on the price of the goods. As entrepreneurial efficiency rises, the expected marginal cost of producing, in this case, x falls; or, in other terms, the expected amount of good x rises and therefore its price relative to that of y falls. Therefore the more successful the entrepreneur, the more the trading partner could receive while the entrepreneur can only get what the trading partner is willing and able to supply of y. The following proposition makes this explicit.
Proposition 11
If there is positive entrepreneurial activity, the expected price of x in terms of y is decreasing in both γ and m 1 .
The proof is omitted for brevity but is found by a comparative statics analysis of the price found in the proof of proposition 9 (in the appendix). Entrepreneurial success can drive the relative price of other goods higher and therefore the entrepreneur can actually become hindered by his own success. This "winner's curse" type phenomenon may help explain such things as technology sharing.
23 . Proposition 11 shows how entrepreneurial activity in one industry can have ripple effects in other industries. This has empirical implications. At the micro level, we may want to investigate the dynamics that could occur between industries due to the presence of entrepreneurial activity. For example, can we investigate industries that have seen relative price increases and determine whether they have experienced more entrepreneurial failures or whether other industries have experienced more entrepreneurial successes? Do these price changes encourage more productive activity in those industries? How does entrepreneurial behavior in various industries respond to these price signals?
Whether successful or unsuccessful, entrepreneurial effort, l e > 0, alters the relative prices in a market economy. While some might view this as instability of the market system, this increased volatility is a sign of economic growth. Although sometimes that growth is negative, the historical trend of economic growth in market based economies is overwhelmingly positive Baumol [2002] .
Conclusion
This paper takes the new classical consumer-producer paradigm and makes explicit the role of the entrepreneur. The model demonstrates a positive feedback between entrepreneurial behavior, increasing returns to specialization and markets. Without assuming increasing returns to specialization directly, we show how entrepreneurs, by attempting to change the status quo, alter the comparative advantages in an economy. This opens a window for trade and specialization. Ricardian gains from trade are further reinforced by an indirect return to specialization due to the entrepreneur devoting more time to implement an idea and therefore increasing his (and the trading partner's) expected utility.
Without assuming that entrepreneurial behavior is driven by a monopoly profit incentive, we show how even a competitive market gives a potential entrepreneur an incentive to be an entrepreneur. Most studies of entrepreneurship assume some type of oligopoly or monopoly environment for the entrepreneur. This, though, is more an ex-post consequence of entrepreneurial activity (and/or a consequence of intellectual property laws). Note too that the model can easily incorporate monopolistic or oligopolistic elements and future studies (especially applied) may find this reasonable. However, we contend that entrepreneurs act from a competitive environment. It is their act of trying to create gains that make them entrepreneurs and this is why, from an economic perspective, we study them as a resource.
We also do not need to assume the entrepreneur receives intrinsic benefit from entrepreneurial activity as an inducement to be entrepreneurial. Nor do we assume entrepreneurship is embodied in any particular institutional form (e.g., a firm). In short, we do not have to assume the individual is any different from another individual apart from the fact that he or she has an idea for an improvement.
The fact that we can analytically model entrepreneurship in a familiar microeconomic framework, will help us systematically investigate the role of entrepreneurs in an economy. This model is intended as a building block to begin a ground-up understanding of an entrepreneurial economy. Future studies can build more complexity into the economy and assumptions can be altered to study such questions as what the economic effects of the entrepreneur are, how institutions affect the entrepreneur and what the welfare distributional effects of an entrepreneurial economy are. This framework can also help inform empirical investigation and policy. Lastly, we can bring this tool into the classroom to help explain entrepreneurship, innovation and capitalism within a unified micro-theoretical framework.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9
Proof To prove this proposition we continue solving the problem in the proof of Proposition 8 by using the optimal l By assumption 2, we can find the Walrasian price that clears the market. For this, we must also solve the trading partner's decision problem.
Recall that by assumption 1, the trading partner operates according to the status quo technology and by theorem 1 will produce and sell y. Her problem then is: The second equation is the entrepreneur's expected utility in autarky. It can be checked that for any (γ, m 1 ) pair in the range for which l e ≥ 0 for both equations, it is true that E[U M ] > E[U A ]. Therefore in order for equations (A4) and (A5) above to be equal (when γ is constant), it must be true that m Q.E.D.
